Case Comments   0. Master And Servant
Raybuck V. Usx, Inc by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 50 | Issue 1 Article 26
Winter 1-1-1993
Case Comments 0. Master And Servant Raybuck V.
Usx, Inc
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Case Comments 0. Master And Servant Raybuck V. Usx, Inc, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 372 (1993),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol50/iss1/26
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:243
first brought in state court. The suit in Farrell, however, was by retired
employees against their former employer, a claim over which the federal
and state courts shared concurrent jurisdiction.7 3 Because the state court
had not been clearly without jurisdiction, tolling was appropriate.
Shofer's ERISA-specific holding appears consistent with the more gen-
eral accord of the circuits: some subject matter jurisdiction must have
existed in the state court of filing, or at least the plaintiff must have relied
on a reasonable legal theory supporting state jurisdiction before the courts
will consider equitable tolling in a subsequent federal suit. 74 Where, as in
Shofer, a claim involves subject matter that is plainly of exclusive federal
jurisdiction, such tolling is unavailable.
0. MASTER AND SERVANT
Raybuck v. USX, Inc.
961 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1992)
The granting of stock options to management employees, in an effort
to promote the long-term financial interests of the issuing corporation, to
motivate key employees, and to identify the interests of those employees
with the interests of the stockholders of the corporation, has become a
common part of the benefit and compensation packages offered by many
corporations. These stock option plans frequently include provisions which
allow the corporation issuing the options to revoke these stock options in
the best interests of the corporation.
In Raybuck v. USX, Inc.575 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered the right of a retired management employee to
exercise a series of outstanding stock options after he accepted employment
with a direct competitor of the issuing corporation. In addition to consid-
ering the employee's right to the stock options, the Fourth Circuit also
examined whether the law of the place of incorporation, or the law of the
place where the last act which made the contract binding, controlled.176
The facts in Raybuck were essentially undisputed. Robert W. Raybuck
was a retired management employee of the defendant, USX, Inc. Raybuck
began working for USX in 1955. In 1976 USX established a Management
Incentive Plan granting options to purchase USX stock to chosen manage-
ment employees. These options were granted to Raybuck annually from
1978 to 1985. In 1986 Raybuck elected to apply for an early retirement
573. Farrell v. Automobile Club, 870 F.2d 1129, 1134 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B) (1988)).
574. Fox v. Eaton Corp., 615 F.2d 716, 719-20 (6th Cir. 1980); see supra note 561 (listing
similar holdings among circuits).
575. 961 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1992).
576. Raybuck v. USX, Inc., 961 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1992).
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program offered by USX. USX accepted Raybuck's application effective
August 31, 1986.
In October of 1986, Raybuck accepted a position as a consultant to
Bethlehem Steel, a major competitor of USX. On January 1, 1987, Raybuck
became the full time plant manager of Bethlehem Steel's Sparrows Point
plant. On December 30, 1986, USX cancelled Raybuck's stock options after
learning of his employment with Bethlehem Steel and informed Raybuck of
the cancellation by letter dated January 8, 1987. Raybuck then submitted
his options for payment, which USX refused. Raybuck subsequently brought
suit in the United State District Court for the District of Maryland.
77
Raybuck's basic claim was for breach of contract. Raybuck also raised
a conflict of laws issue as to whether the law of Pennsylvania or Delaware
applied. Additionally, Raybuck raised claims for breach of implied contract,
breach of fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing, intentional inter-
ference with property, fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresen-
tation, which the trial court found to be unsupported.
The district court treated Raybuck as a question of contract interpre-
tation. This interpretation centered upon two passages in the Management
Incentive Plan and a passage in the stock options themselves. Section 4 of
the Management Incentive Plan stated that:
The options shall contain such conditions and restrictions as to the
purchase and delivery of shares, and such provisions as to the rights
of the Corporation in the event of a breach of the agreement to
continue as an employee, as may be deemed advisable for the
protection of the Corporation.
5 78
Section 11 of the Plan declared that "If a participant retires prior to
termination of his optiopa without having fully executed his option, he shall
have the right to exercise or surrender the option during its term within
such period as may be provided in the option, not to exceed three years
after retirement. ' 5 79 Finally, paragraph 3 of the stock options contained a
provision granting the Compensation Committee the right to cancel the
options ". . . after the Optionee retires at any age when the Committee
deems such cancellation to be in the best interests of the Corporation.' '580
As a preliminary matter, the court decided which state law applied.
Raybuck argued for the application of Delaware law, the state of incor-
poration for USX. The district court disagreed, and instead applied the law
of the place of contract. In making this determination the district court
relied upon Stout v. Home Life Insurance Co. 581 Stout addressed the question
577. Raybuck v. USX, Inc., No. CIV.JFM-89-2260, 1990 WL 3528200 (D. Md. June 18,
1990). The district court decision in Raybuck v. USX, Inc. was a memorandum decision not
reported in the Federal Supplement. Id.
578. Id. at *3.
579. Id. at *2.
580. Id.
581. 651 F. Supp. 28 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 818 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1987).
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of where a series of life insurance policies had become binding. Under
Maryland conflict of law rules, the Stout court applied the laws of the state
in which the last act making the agreement a binding contract was per-
formed . 8 2 In Raybuck, Pennsylvania is where USX administered the plan
and where Raybuck would have redeemed the options. The district court
therefore applied the law of Pennsylvania.
As to the meaning of the contract, Raybuck argued that the terms of.
the Management Incentive Plan gave him an absolute vested right to exercise
his options at any time within three years of his retirement, and that any
conflicting language in the options was void. Section 11 of the defendant's
Management Incentive Plan allowed a retired participant in the plan to
exercise their options, or surrender them, during the term provided in the
option, for up to three years after the individual's retirement. Raybuck
argued that this section was dispositive of his right to exercise his options.
USX, however, pointed to the fact that paragraph 3 of each of the options
signed by Raybuck granted USX's Compensation Committee the power to
cancel an employees options at any time, so long as it was in the corpor-
ation's best interest. Raybuck had full knowledge that the options which
he accepted contained this cancellation clause.
The district court agreed with USX, finding that paragraph 11 of the
Management Incentive Plan did not guarantee Raybuck a three-year period
in which to exercise his options. The court found that paragraph 1 1 provided
that the option period shall not exceed three years, but did not preclude an
earlier cancellation date. The District Court concluded that paragraph 4 of
the management incentive plan gave USX the right to cancel the options of
a former employee now working for a direct competitor, when USX
reasonably concluded that cancellation was in the best interests of the
corporation. The district court therefore applied the law of Pennsylvania
and granted summary judgment for the defendant on all counts, holding
that USX's Compensation Committee cancelled Raybuck's stock options
under power vested in it by its Board of Directors under the terms of the
Management Incentive Plan and the terms of the options themselves.
Raybuck appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. As to the conflict of law issue, Raybuck argued that because the
case involved the internal affairs of USX the laws of the place of incor-
poration should apply. Raybuck cited Beard v. Elster 83 and Ellis v. Emhart
Manufacturing Co.5 4 as support for this proposition. Beard was a share-
holders' derivative suit examining whether or not a series of stock options
granted to American Airlines employees was valid. The Beard court held
that the issuance of a stock option plan by a Delaware corporation involved
the internal affairs of the corporation, and that therefore the laws of
582. Stout v. Home Life Ins. Co., 651 F. Supp. 28, 32 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 818 F.2d 29
(4th Cir. 1987).
583. 160 A.2d 731 (Del. Ch. 1960).
584. 191 A.2d 546 (Conn. 1963).
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Delaware controlled.5 5 In Ellis, the executor of the estate of Joseph Adam
sought to exercise a series of stock options granted to the decedent by
Emhart Manufacturing Company.586 After Adam's death, the Board of
Directors interpreted the terms of the stock option plan in a manner that
limited the right of the plaintiff, as Adam's executor, to exercise the options.
The principal issue before the Ellis court was whether an attempt by the
Board of Directors to interpret the plan so as to limit rights already granted
the decedent would be binding on the decedent's executor. Citing Beard v.
Elster, the Ellis court held that the issuance of a stock option plan involved
the internal affairs of the corporation, and should be governed by the laws
of the state of incorporation.5 7
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with Raybuck's application of precedent,
distinguishing Beard and Ellis from Raybuck. The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that Beard and Ellis involved stockholders' suits challenging the power of
a corporation to grant stock options under the law of the state of incor-
poration, whereas Raybuck was essentially a contract dispute. Because
Raybuck had not challenged the power of the defendant to grant the options,
the Fourth Circuit found the rationale cited for the application of Delaware
law unpersuasive. The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's
rationale and concluded that Pennsylvania law applied.
The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the district court's interpretation of
the contract. The Fourth Circuit stated that:
the clarity of the cancellation clause in the stock option negates any
credible assertion by Raybuck that he was unaware that his options
were subject to cancellation in what USX deemed to be its best
interests, and when he became employed by Bethlehem Steel before
exercising his options, he was acting at his own risk.588
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Raybuck read too much into paragraph
11 of the Management Incentive plan, and that the "retirement exception"
to the automatic termination of the stock options upon an individual's
ceasing employment with the defendant did not in any way alter the other
conditions and restrictions imposed upon the options by USX.
The Fouirth Circuit's decision in Raybuck adds to a small but growing
body of law dealing with the rights of former employees to claim unexercised
stock options after the voluntary or involuntary termination of their em-
ployment with the corporation issuing the options. Raybuck is the first
decision in the Fourth Circuit to examine the right of a corporation to
terminate the stock options of a former employee who accepts employment
with a direct competitor. For the Fourth Circuit, the mere fact that a claim
involves a decision by a board of directors does not mean that the claim
585. Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 735 (Del. Ch. 1960).
586. Ellis v. Emhart Mfg. Co., 191 A.2d 546, 547 (Conn. 1963).
587. Id. at 550.
588. Raybuck v. USX, Inc., 961 F.2d 484, 489 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991).
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